Irish Repeal and Garrisonian disunionism may seem to share little in common. But Garrisonians believed they were analogous. Garrison referred to disunionism as the ''great question of a repeal of the Union,'' deliberately evoking O'Connell's movement. In 1842 he proposed that the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS) should make ''the REPEAL OF THE UNION . . . [its] grand rallying point.'' Beginning in May, his editorial masthead demanded ''A REPEAL OF THE UNION BE-TWEEN NORTHERN LIBERTY AND SOUTHERN SLAVERY.'' When the AASS made ''No Union with Slaveholders'' its official slogan in 1844, Garrison praised its decision to ''hoist the banner of 'Repeal.' '' Even one critic called disunionism the ''doctrine of 'Repeal.' '' But Garrisonian allusions went beyond euphemisms to extended comparisons. Garrison claimed to support ''the repeal of the union between England and Ireland . . . on the same ground, and for the same reason'' that he supported ''the repeal of the union between the North and the South.'' In 1843, Quincy wrote in the Liberator that Repeal was ''precisely analogous'' to abolitionists' ''line of policy.'' For Garrisonians, disunionism and Repeal were not only contemporaneous but also comparable. (6 vols., Cambridge, MA, 1971 -1981 , 3: 74 [hereafter cited as LWLG]; ''The Annual Meeting at New-York, '' Liberator, Apr. 22, 1842; Liberator, May 20, 1842; Garrison to James B. Yerrinton, May 7, 1844, LWLG, 3: 256; David Lee Child quoted in Wendell Phillips Garrison and Francis Jackson Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story of His Life Told by His Children (4 vols., Boston, MA, 1885-1889), 3: 98; Garrison to Abel Brown, Mar. 18, 1842, LWLG, 3: 56-57 ; ''The Irish Repeal Movement, '' Liberator, Sept. 8, 1843 . See also ''Repeal of the Union,'' Liberator, May 6, 1842; Garrison to the AASS, May 9, 1842, LWLG, 3: 71; ''The Union, '' Vermont Telegraph (rep.) , Liberator, June 24, 1842; ''In the Conflict, '' Liberator, Jan. 20, 1843; ''Repeal!'' Herald of Freedom (rep.) , Liberator, June 14, 1844; Garrison, ''Address to the Slaves,'' in Stanley Harrold, The Rise of Aggressive Abolitionism: Addresses to the Slaves (Lexington, KY, 2004) , 178. Previously the simultaneity of disunionism and Repeal has been noted only in passing. See introduction to Clare Taylor, ed., British and American Abolitionists: An Episode in Transatlantic Understanding (Edinburgh, 1974) , 7; Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York, 1995) , 17; Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New York, 1998), 314. 1840, Garrisonian delegates had attended a ''World's Convention'' on antislavery in London, where Americans like Phillips and Garrison met an Irish delegation that included O'Connell, whom Garrison already knew from an earlier 1833 meeting. The Convention strengthened existing ties between Garrisonians and English abolitionists like George Thompson and Elizabeth Pease, while also inaugurating new friendships with Irish abolitionists like Richard D. Webb, James Haughton, and Richard Allen, leaders of Dublin's Hibernian Anti-Slavery Society who were also involved in other reform movements for temperance and peace. Several Garrisonian delegates traveled to Dublin and lodged with the Hibernians, who corresponded regularly and intimately with Garrisonians after 1840. Letters and newspapers sent by this circle of Irish abolitionists and reformers were often published in the American antislavery press, keeping Garrisonians abreast of British reforms and their potential usefulness to abolitionists. In Ireland Garrisonians made many fast friends, but at home they were besieged by critics both inside and outside the antislavery movement. Most American abolitionists believed that calls for disunion were counterproductive, a charge Garrisonians hoped to answer by comparing themselves with Repealers. Garrisonians also believed such analogies might attract Irish Americans to their ranks. In early 1842, while urging disunion for the first time, Garrisonians were publicizing the ''Irish Address,'' an antislavery petition from O'Connell to the growing number of Irish immigrants to the United States. Abolitionists promoted the Address by citing friendships with Irish reformers and by claiming, as fellow disunionists, to support Repeal. Garrison declared in a letter about the Address that he was ''both an Irish Repealer and an American Repealer. I go for the repeal of the union between England and Ireland, and for the repeal of the Union between North and South. '' 4 Garrisonian allusions to Repeal were thus products of the historical intersection of the birth of Irish Repeal, the birth of new transatlantic abolitionist networks, and the birth of Garrisonian disunionism. By narrating these developments together, this article makes three related arguments. First, it challenges the view that Garrisonian disunionists were more concerned with personal purity than with politics. Garrisonians, who rejected voting and third-party organization, are often faulted for mistaking ''the avoidance of politics for progress even as political abolitionism eclipsed [their] own movement.'' But that view mistakes disunionism for the ''avoidance of politics.'' Far from ignoring political action, Garrisonians' disunionism stemmed from close attention to politics-particularly to political debates surrounding slavery that occurred throughout 1842. Garrisonians saw disunionism not as an apolitical strategy, but instead as a political alternative to voting that was partly inspired and made intelligible by extraparliamentary politics abroad. (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 19-20, 115, 132-33; John L. Thomas, ''Romantic Reform in America, 1815 -1865 ,'' American Quarterly 17 (Winter 1965 Thomas, The Liberator, William Lloyd Garrison: A Biography (Boston, MA, 1963) , 319-28. For accounts of disunionism as alternative political action, see A second argument emphasizes the value of placing antebellum reform within transnational contexts. Historians of antebellum reform are beginning to learn what scholars have already shown of later movements-that ''Atlantic crossings'' provided activists with foreign models that they appropriated and shaped to their own ends. Garrisonians' interest in Irish Repeal exemplifies just such antebellum Atlantic exchanges, even as it reveals the limits of transatlantic reform alliances before the Civil War.
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My third argument concerns timing. Because disunionism is often described as a dogmatic idée fixe, historians sometimes imply that its emergence in 1842 was a foregone conclusion once Garrison rejected voting in 1836. Likewise, historians have used Garrison's writings from the 1850s to illustrate his original reasons for disunionism. Yet viewing disunionism as a static idea does not illuminate why Garrison called for disunion in 1842, rather than earlier or later. And once the timing of Garrison's decision is emphasized, early disunionism emerges less as a priggish quest for self-purification and more as a calculated response to events unfolding on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1840s.
In May 1842, a few months after Garrison urged the AASS to advocate ''disunion,'' the antiabolitionist New York Herald published an alarmist editorial. The Herald noted that ''until the recent assemblage of the World's Convention in London, and the pilgrimage of several British abolitionists to this country,'' abolitionists had ''never dared to come out openly, and propose a REPEAL OF THE UNION.'' Anglophobia was typical for the Herald, but here the paper was partially correct. Garrisonian disunionism did emerge only after the World's Convention, and Gar- (Baltimore, MD, 1978) , 129-145; James B. Stewart, ''The Aims and Impact of Garrisonian Abolitionism, 1840 -1860 ,'' Civil War History 15, no. 3 (1969 6. For antebellum reform, see, for example, Bonnie Anderson, Joyous Greetings: The First International Women's Movement, 1830 -1860 (New York, 2000 To understand how disunionism and Repeal became so entangled requires us to revisit the origins of disunionism, which can be dated precisely to early 1842. Although seldom emphasized, there were specific reasons why Garrison chose that moment to urge disunion. Throughout the year, slavery was becoming increasingly politicized and abolitionists became more convinced than ever that the federal government was subservient to a ''Slave Power.'' In 1842, the Supreme Court ruled in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that slaveholders could capture fugitives without ob-struction from states, a ruling whose implications were manifested that fall with the capture of fugitive slave George Latimer in Boston. President John Tyler, a southerner, appeared to palliate slaveholders by supporting Texas annexation. And in Congress, a ''gag'' on antislavery petitions stymied discussions of slavery.
To many abolitionists, these developments proved the need for a third party. Members of the Liberty Party, founded in 1840, believed that defeating the Slave Power required the election of abolitionists, or at least the use of abolitionist votes to pressure antislavery politicians like John Quincy Adams and Joshua Giddings. But Garrisonians rejected ''third party'' politics for numerous well-known reasons, including their principled opposition to voting and their increasingly radical view that the Constitution itself was a proslavery document.
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Yet Garrisonians were no less concerned than third-party abolitionists about the drift of national politics in the early 1840s. In his debates with Liberty Party apologists, Garrison repeatedly insisted that by withdrawing from electoral politics he did not give up the hope of influencing policymakers. Garrison endorsed political action ''in its broadest sense,'' defined as any effort to ''influence'' voters or elected officials to oppose slavery. But because he rejected the most direct form of political actionvoting-he needed a strategic alternative to party formation. Garrisonians needed a strategy that enabled them to influence politicians, without condoning the Constitution or becoming politicians themselves.
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Advocating disunion struck Garrisonians as just such a strategy-a political alternative for abolitionists who rejected third-party organization. By advocating disunion, Garrison and his supporters could consistently refuse to vote and continue their growing assault on the proslavery Constitution. At the same time, they believed disunionist agitation was a sure means of gaining leverage in Congress-a belief seemingly borne out by their close attention to debates over the ''gag rule'' in the winter of 1842.
Although disunionism is often seen as the epitome of Garrisonian indifference to politics, it was first suggested to Garrison by events in Congress. On January 24, 1842, former president John Quincy Adams rose in the House of Representatives to read an antislavery petition from 46 citizens of Haverhill, Massachusetts. Challenging the ''gag rule'' was nothing new for Adams, who had fought against it since its inception in 1836. But this petition was unprecedented, because instead of focusing narrowly on slavery, it asked Congress to ''adopt measures peaceably to dissolve the Union of these states.'' Southern Congressmen were enraged. George Hopkins suggested ''burn[ing] the petition in the presence of the House,'' while fellow Virginian Henry A. Wise advocated the censure of anyone who ''offered such a petition to this body.'' House business stalled for two weeks until February 7, when Representatives tabled motions for Adams's censure and refused the Haverhill petition.
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In intervening debates, however, southerners uniformly interpreted disunion as a prospect harmful to slavery. Wise foreshadowed the Herald by seeing in the petition an Anglo-American abolitionist conspiracy. But on January 27, Joseph Underwood of Kentucky explained most clearly why southerners opposed the petition. Once the ''bonds of this Union'' broke, he said, the Ohio River and Mason and Dixon line would beckon as foreign borders for fugitive slaves, and ''slavery was done in Kentucky, Maryland, and a large portion of Virginia.'' ''The dissolution of the Union,'' Underwood concluded, ''was the dissolution of slavery. '' 14 That statement caught the immediate attention of Garrison, who printed excerpts from House debates throughout February and March. In February, at a meeting of the Essex County Anti-Slavery Society, Garrison submitted resolutions for the ''dissolution of the Union,'' echoing Underwood's claim that this would dissolve slavery, and on March 11, he excerpted Underwood's speech in the Liberator, highlighting its ''precious confessions'' that ending the Union would end slavery. Histo- Garrison's transatlantic correspondence also emphasized his attention to the Haverhill debates. In 1842, many Garrisonians wrote to British correspondents about the struggle over the ''gag rule'' in Congress, and Garrison was no exception. ''The anti-slavery excitement is daily increasing in this country,'' he told Irish abolitionist Charles L. Corkran a month after the Haverhill petition. A crisis was ''at hand, which, though it may possibly end in the dissolution of the American Union, will inevitably result in the downfall of our nefarious slave system.'' To Webb, Garrison wrote of the ''tremendous excitement in Congress, arising from the presentation of a petition for the peaceable dissolution of the American Union,'' which was ''driving the slaveholding representatives to the wall. ' Abolitionists, ed. Taylor, 166, But if the Haverhill petition sparked Garrison's new disunionism, it was unclear what disunionism meant. At the least, Garrison believed ''disunionists'' should withdraw personally from the Union by refusing to vote or seek office. But those views were at least five years old. By ''disunion'' Garrison now meant more than just not voting, since he adopted Underwood's argument that disunion would create a haven for fugitive slaves. Advocating personal withdrawal from politics was typical of Garrison; advocating the Union's dissolution was new.
Even that demand, though, was still not always explicit. Garrisonians sometimes argued that disunion, while a possible outcome of their agitation, was not inevitable. Instead, by demonstrating northern support for disunion, abolitionists could persuade southerners to abolish slavery without disunion. To do this, abolitionists would first convince ''the consciences of the people'' that slavery depended on the Union. Possessed by that ''startling truth,'' Garrisonians believed northerners would sign ''thousands of petitions'' modeled on the Haverhill letter. Such agitation, according to Wright, would ''make a right and effectual issue with the South, and say-'Release us from all support of slavery, or we dissolve the Union.' '' In short, disunionism would, as Richard Allen wrote from Ireland, ''prove a powerful engine with which to agitate the public mind. '' 17 An address issued by the AASS in 1844 delineated this strategy with rare clarity. The AASS called on northerners to ''circulate a declaration of DISUNION FROM SLAVEHOLDERS, throughout the country. Hold mass meetings-assemble in conventions.'' Their goal would not be an ''anarchical movement.'' Rather, disunionists had four aims: ''first, to create discussion and agitation throughout the North''; ''secondly, to convulse the South like an earthquake, and convince her that her only alternative is, to abolish slavery, or be abandoned by that power on which she now relies for safety''; ''thirdly, to attack the slave power in its most vulnerable point''; and ''fourthly, to exalt the moral sense'' of northerners.
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The actual dissolution of the Union was conspicuously absent from that list. If the South capitulated to popular pressure and abolished slav- ery, there would be no need for repeal. In 1844, Philadelphia abolitionist Edward Davis told Wendell Phillips that while he supported disunionism, he did not believe the North and the South actually would form ''separate governments.'' Rather, thanks to disunionist agitation, ''the people may yet come to acknowledge our principles . . . enough to influence the action of those who make & change our laws,'' obviating the need for disunion. ''Altho' we cry out 'dissolution' because we are involved in the guilt of slave holding,'' Davis wrote, ''yet I believe our arguments for dissolution will erradicate [sic] the evil of slavery, & then, will not our government be a free one and our compact a just one?'' Arguments for disunion would avert disunion.
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To be sure, as Davis noted, Garrison also stressed the North's complicity in ''the guilt of slave holding,'' implying that disunion was obligatory regardless of expediency. In one editorial, Garrison urged his readers to ''demand the repeal of the Union, or the abolition of slaverynot as a THREAT, but as A MORAL OBLIGATION . . . to clear . . . your souls from blood-guiltiness.'' But Garrison's denial that disunion was a threat was belied by his frequent allusions to Underwood's fears, and also by the fact that he framed disunionism as a conditional demand for ''the repeal of the Union'' or ''the abolition of slavery.'' Because Garrisonians demanded either ''Dissolution of the Union, or the Abolition of Slavery,'' as Wright put it, their rhetoric usually made disunion one potential outcome of abolitionist agitation, rather than the inevitable one. Garrison's first editorial on the subject promised to demand disunion ''until it be accomplished, or slavery cease to pollute our soil,'' implying that if slavery ceased, so would disunionism.
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Garrison made this implication explicit in an 1846 speech given in England, where he was touring for the third time in thirteen years. Garrison explained that disunionism created ''consternation'' in the South. Southerners ''knew right well that the dissolution of the Union was the dissolution of slavery,'' Garrison said, borrowing the same phrasing Underwood used in 1842. But ''he did not think,'' Garrison continued, in remarks later printed in the Liberator, ''that it would be necessary to dissolve the Union. The Southern States, when they found the abolitionists determined, and that they had no choice but emancipation or dissolution, would say the time had come for the abolition of slavery, and let their slaves go free.'' Here Garrison clearly envisioned an ultimatum, and other Garrisonians did the same. The Tocsin of Liberty, an Albany paper still allied with Garrison in 1842, claimed not to advocate an ''unconditional repeal of the Union, but if slavery is to be perpetuated in this free republic . . . we should go for repeal. But our hope is yet, that slavery will be overcome without so great a sacrifice as such a repeal would be.'' Extenuating ''buts'' were typical of early disunionism and coexisted with moral admonitions to ''come out'' of sin.
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But few abolitionists rallied to ''repeal,'' conditional or otherwise. Instead, disunionism deepened Garrison's alienation from other abolitionists. In 1840, Lewis Tappan and James Birney had led an exodus from the AASS to protest Garrison's radical views on subjects like ''comeouterism''-shorthand for the Perfectionism of utopian John Humphrey Noyes-and ''nonresistance''-a radical Christian pacifism that saw all human governments as sinful. Birneyites and Tappanites often blamed Noyes for introducing these ideas to Garrison, who converted to both in 1836 and who was moved by his nonresistance views to reject voting. In 1842, Tappanites and Liberty Party supporters saw disunionism as ''come-outerism'' by another name-further proof of Noyes's influence and Garrison's indifference to politics.
''Come-outerism'' and ''nonresistance'' undoubtedly did prepare the way for ''disunionism,'' mainly by strengthening Garrison's self-image as the movement's radical gadfly. But it was not true, as critics suggested, that those doctrines were logically identical or were all traceable to Noyes. Not all disunionists were Perfectionists, with Wendell Phillips being the most prominent example. And if nonresistance and ''comeouterism'' entailed disunionism, Garrison might have advocated disunion in 1836, when he first encountered Noyes, instead of six years later, in 1842. But the chronological gap between Garrison's conversions to nonresistance and disunionism hints at the ideological distance be- Pledge,'' Liberator, June 27, 1845, which made the usual claim that disunion would ''clear our skirts from innocent blood'' but at the same time asserted that disunionism was the ''most consistent, feasible means of abolishing slavery.'' tween them. As historian Lewis Perry has noted, ''only in the minds of . . . critics of Garrisonism were disunionism and nonresistance thought of as synonymous.'' Nonresistants attacked all human governments as sinful, whereas disunionists indicted one specific government and argued for a more perfect Union.
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Even some of Garrison's friends regarded disunionism as inconsistent with nonresistance. In June 1842, Philadelphia abolitionist Elizabeth Neall explained to Pease, whom she met at the World's Convention, that ''the Dissolution Question is creating quite a stir among us. Garrison is accused of inconsistency . . . because it is a Political Question.'' The chief critic within Garrison's circle was Nathaniel P. Rogers, who aired his reservations about disunionism in letters to the British reformers he had also met in 1840. In letters to Webb, his closest overseas correspondent, Rogers argued that disunionism ultimately required political actions that nonresistants rejected. ''Garrison is advocating the dissolution of our political Union,'' but such an act was ''a thing our politicians alone can do.'' Rogers supported Garrison's calls for personal withdrawal from politics as the ''dictum of nonresistants.'' But political disunion required an ''act of suffrage at the polls. How W[illiam] Lloyd can advocate it, when he could not conscientiously take any part in it, I do not see.'' Tellingly, Rogers added that political disunionism was as different from moral-suasion abolitionism as Irish Repeal was from the Irish temperance movement. In both cases, disunionism represented entanglement in politics. ''Garrison holds politics a mortal sin,'' complained Rogers, ''yet he fills his paper with the doings of politicians. '' 23 By 1845, Rogers had abandoned Garrison, and even Noyes was advising followers to ''come out'' from disunionists. Garrison, meanwhile, maintained that disunionism allowed nonresistants to influence Congress without voting. But he was running a gauntlet of criticism from two sides. Political abolitionists dismissed disunionism as ''come-outerism'' writ large, while ''come-outers'' criticized it as too political.
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It was partly to reply to such criticisms that Garrisonians drew analogies between disunionism and Irish Repeal. Pointing to O'Connell as a model, Garrisonians hoped, might convert political abolitionists from skepticism about disunionism, while reassuring nonresistants who were skeptical about politics. O'Connell's coattails looked promising, since he was admired by abolitionists on both sides of the schism. 29. ''The Irish in America, '' Liberator, Dec. 15, 1843; Chapman, ''O'Connell,'' Liberator, Aug. 18, 1843. suspicion was typical for Webb, who warned that O'Connell was a temporizer, a drinker, a superstitious Catholic, and a bad landlord to boot. Yet his warnings primarily expressed skepticism about rapprochement with politicians. Webb criticized Repeal because ''politics and Political efforts and politicians are full of unsoundness, and void of principle, and slaves of the Tyrant Expediency. '' 30 Excepting Rogers, however, few Garrisonians heeded Webb. His criticisms of O'Connell rarely appeared in the Liberator, while paeans to O'Connell frequently did. Even Webb's animus softened during 1843, when he began to suggest that despite his aversion to politics, he was ''in theory & talk . . . more of a repealer and a radical than anything else.'' While it was ''faint praise,'' Webb conceded that O'Connell was ''as honest as . . . a politician could be.'' He also told Quincy that O'Connell deserved respect as an abolitionist: ''Thou knows that I am by no means an O'Connellite: nevertheless whatever he be, he is the man who above all . . . has done the most valiantly for the Slave.'' Most Garrisonians agreed with that sentiment more than with Webb's attacks on O'Connell. Pease's view was more common: Whatever the failings of O'Connell, she wrote, ''the right of the demand [for Repeal], I cannot see how any honest mind can deny.'' Garrisonians echoed that support for Repeal throughout the 1840s.
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Garrisonians supported Irish Repeal not only to defend disunionism, but also to serve another purpose. In 1842, Garrisonians were pursuing an unlikely alliance with Irish immigrants, and they hoped to be aided by their connections with Irish abolitionists. In the 1840s Garrisonians believed Irish immigrants, many of whom were Repealers, were changing American political alignments for the worse. Repeal societies were being founded in major cities from New York to New Orleans, and the Democratic Party, to abolitionists' chagrin, courted Irish American Repealers by praising O'Connell. ''The Irish population among us is nearly all 'democratic,' '' Garrison noted in March 1842, because ''leading democratic journals'' were all ''in favor of Irish Repeal.'' But Garrison feared Irish voters were being hoodwinked by these political overtures into supporting ''the defender . . . of slavery.'' Irish and Democratic ''Demagogues'' were forging ''a 'union,' most unnatural and horrible!'' would ''increase the hold which we are of late beginning to have on the confidence of the Irish population of this city. '' 34 Likewise, when Garrisonians in Boston held a massive meeting at Faneuil Hall in January 1842 to unveil the Address, speakers emphasized their support for Repeal. Resolutions were adopted wishing ''Old Ireland success, in all her righteous efforts to redeem the Emerald Isle from every species of oppression, and especially in the grand movement . . . for the repeal of the fraudulent act of Union.'' James Canning Fuller, an Irish native, claimed that support for Irish freedom required him to support abolitionism. Phillips described Ireland as ''the land of agitation and agitators,'' urging abolitionists to ''learn a lesson from her.'' Garrison denounced England's treatment of Ireland under the Union as an example of the ''true slaveholding style'' and endorsed Ireland's ''effort to secure her emancipation.'' ''I AM A REPEALER!'' he exclaimed.
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Claiming to be Repealers thus enabled Garrisonians both to defend disunionism and to appeal to Irish Americans. A year after the first Faneuil Hall meeting, Garrison repeated at another meeting that Ireland was ''the victim of an absolute despotism'' and ''truly deserving'' of sympathy. Chapman's editorial on O'Connell claimed that the Irish were second only to American slaves in suffering. Quincy's editorial on Repeal claimed the ''measures'' of Repealers were ''excellent'' and ''analogous'' to abolitionism, insofar ''as their machinery of organization and agitation is concerned.'' It was inconsistent for American supporters of Irish Repeal to denounce abolitionists as traitors, since they used ''the same instrumentalities for the subversion of the domestic institutions of Great Britain, and the dissolution of her glorious Union with Ireland, which Pease, Feb. 15, 1842, in British and American Abolitionists, ed. Taylor, 167; Phillips to Allen, Mar. 30, 1842, in ibid, 171-72; Collins to Webb, Apr. 2, 1842, in ibid, 174; Garrison to Allen, July 2, 1842, LWLG, 3: 92; James Canning Fuller to Daniel O'Connell, Mar. 28, 1842, in The Correspondence of Daniel O'Connell, ed. Maurice R. O'Connell (8 vols.; Dublin, 1973 Dublin, -1980 Eleventh Annual Report, 26, 94. 35. Appendix to Tenth Annual Report . . . of the Mass. Anti-Slavery Society (Boston, MA, 1842), 12; ''Great Anti-Slavery Meeting in Faneuil Hall,'' Liberator, Feb. 4, 1842. they denounce as fanatical and unreasonable when used by their own countrymen, or by Englishmen, for the destruction of slavery. '' 36 These were direct rejoinders to Irish Americans who questioned abolitionists' motives for supporting Repeal. Abolitionists were frequently accused of maliciously embroiling O'Connell in slavery controversies, a view epitomized in a cartoon printed at the time (see Figure 1) . But Garrisonians steadfastly denied that charge, which had the added benefit of refuting the widespread presumption that abolitionists were sycophants to England. In July 1843, the PASS responded to accusations from Philadelphia Repealers by insisting that ''we have never done any thing whatsoever . . . to injure or obstruct the cause of Repeal.'' The PASS desired the ''success of the Irish people in their efforts to effect a peaceable repeal'' of its ''political Union.'' James Haughton was especially indefatigable in lobbying Dublin Repealers, chairing one meeting of the LNRA at which an antislavery address from Pennsylvania was read in O'Connell's presence. In reply, O'Connell redeemed himself by reiterating his abhorrence of slavery. While Pease regretted O'Connell's waffling, she affirmed that he was, ''nevertheless, a great man,'' and Repeal ''one of the grandest movements that ever was enacted in the theatre of the world. '' 38 By the end of 1843, Garrisonian relations with O'Connell were improving, but relations with Irish Americans were grim. When Repeal began to decline after O'Connell's arrest and trial by England in 1844, Garrisonians were left where they began: with mutual admiration between themselves and O'Connell, but few Irish American supporters. Scholars have offered various explanations for their failure. Some scholars have argued that the desire of Irish Americans to prove themselves ''white'' doomed abolitionist efforts. Others cite the good political reasons Irish Americans had to support the pro-immigration, pro-labor agenda of the Democratic Party and to be wary of abolitionists, some of whom barely concealed their anti-Catholic prejudices. 39 Yet given the well-known reasons why an Irish-abolitionist alliance failed, it is easy to overlook the question of why Garrisonians attempted it all. Answering that requires realizing that the Irish Address campaign coincided with the origins of disunionism. When abolitionists convened at Fanueil Hall to unveil the Address, it was only four days after the Haverhill petition had roiled Congress. The Irish Address was even mentioned during Congressional debates, when Virginia's Henry Wise argued that the timing of the petition and the Irish Address suggested an international conspiracy. ''Let no American citizen . . . fail to notice the coincidence of events,'' Wise said. While ''O'Connell was issuing his mandates to every Irishman in the United States . . . to join the Abolition-English-American party,'' a former president had submitted ''a proposition to dissolve the Union. '' 40 Without accepting Wise's paranoia, it is worth noting ''the coincidence of events.'' First, both disunionism and the Irish Address emerged from very recent transatlantic networks between Garrisonians and Irish abolitionists. The same Irish abolitionists who applauded Garrison's calls for a ''Repeal of the Union'' encouraged Garrisonians to believe (sometimes unintentionally) that Irish American Repealers would naturally support disunionism.
Garrisonian disunionism was also related to the Irish Address on a deeper level. Disunionists believed that by rallying northerners against the Union, they could agitate Congress, just as O'Connell's ''monster meetings'' agitated Parliament. But given their use of that analogy, Garrisonians naturally saw the Irish American community as a good place to start amassing support. Rhetorically, after all, their Repeal seemed symmetrical with O'Connell's, and their use of Faneuil Hall to unveil the Address was merely the first of what they hoped would be many ''monster meetings,'' ultimately creating an American Repeal movement similar in form and function to its Irish counterpart. 41 Chimerical as that plan seems now, it underlines that Garrisonians were not totally dismissing political action in 1842, even as they became disunionists. Like O'Connell, they favored extraparliamentary means of effecting political ends, a roundabout politics that made some nonresistants nervous. To critics like Rogers who thought Garrison's disunionism contradicted his principles, the Irish Address also smacked of politicking. Lydia Maria Child noted that ''exciting the ignorant Irish by the use of O'Connell's name, strikes me as work that peculiarly belongs to the Third Party,'' since its most likely outcome would be to ''drive them to the polls.'' As Child realized, Garrisonian attempts to separate Irish voters from Democrats showed that even as they withdrew from the polls, Garrisonians still hoped to affect what went on inside them. Historians may question whether Garrisonian disunionism was an intelligent strategy. But there can be little doubt that in the transatlantic political context of the 1840s, it was an intelligible one. Attempting to rally Irish Americans exemplified the kind of popular politics that Garrisonians believed 40. Cong. Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd Sess., 171 (1842) . 41. See Osofsky, ''Dilemmas of Romantic Nationalism, '' 899. that they could conscientiously do and that O'Connell was already doing. 42 Ultimately, both disunionism and Repeal failed, but several lessons can be learned from their coincidence and interaction. Most broadly, Garrisonian interest in Repeal, like the founding of Irish American Repeal societies, reveals the cross-fertilization of European and American political discourse in the early nineteenth century. In the 1840s, ocean steamers, improved postal services, and rising immigration to America enabled the rapid transatlantic exchange of news and ideas via letters, travel, print, and personal networks. Informed by these exchanges, reformers on one side of the ocean often used politics on the other side to legitimate causes or delegitimize critics.
American radicals, for example, pointed to European movements to defend unpopular movements at home. In 1843, abolitionist Amasa Walker, while touring Dublin, said that ''in looking over England, France and Ireland,'' he had concluded that the ''new and important movements which are now in progress'' vindicated the efficacy of nonviolent agitation. While American reformers looked to Europe for vindication, European reformers like O'Connell worked American political developments into their rhetoric. In one Repeal speech in 1843, O'Connell attacked Prime Minister Robert Peel by comparing Peel's rumored plan to suppress Repeal meetings with the ''gag rule.'' ''I will tell Sir Robert Peel where he may find a suggestion for his bill,'' O'Connell said. ''In the American Congress . . . they have passed a law, that the house shall not receive any petitions from slaves, nor any petitions on behalf of slaves.'' O'Connell suggested that act as a ''model'' for Peel's ''bill for coercion. '' 43 Yet antebellum Atlantic crossings produced rhetorical analogies more easily than substantive alliances. Despite close ties with Dublin reformers like Webb and Haughton, Garrisonians never created an Irish-abolitionist 42. Lydia Maria Child to Chapman, Apr. 26, 1842 , in Lydia Maria Child: Selected Letters, 1817 -1880 , ed. Milton Meltzer and Patricia G. Holland (Amherst, MA, 1982 front. Transatlantic organization also proved problematic for Irish Repealers, as O'Connell discovered when Irish Americans rejected his antislavery counsels. In the end, transatlantic networks did not demonstrably aid either Garrison or O'Connell. Even at Repeal's highest tide, control of Ireland's movement for Home Rule was quickly passing into the hands of militant nationalists who viewed O'Connell's dalliances with abolitionists to be a damaging distraction from the cause of Ireland. Meanwhile, far from vindicating abolitionists in the eyes of American critics, networks with British reformers raised suspicions of traitorous conspiracies.
Although transatlantic alliances remained organizationally weak during the antebellum period, it is still worth following the gaze of reformers across the Atlantic. Understanding their allusions to and exchanges with European reformers helps us better understand what groups like the Garrisonians aimed to do. The discursive world of Garrisonians was not bounded by national borders, so when searching for the sources of ''disunionism,'' it is a mistake to focus only on homegrown influences like come-outerism. Likewise, when characterizing ''disunionism'' it is a mistake to juxtapose it solely with the third-party politics practiced by abolitionists like Birney. If the Liberty Party really represented the only political action available to abolitionists in the 1840s, then by comparison the Garrisonians certainly were apolitical. But if ''third-party'' abolitionism is placed on a broader, transatlantic spectrum of political action that includes popular extraparliamentary movements like Repeal, the Garrisonians' place on that spectrum can be viewed differently.
After 1845, Garrisonians referred to disunion less and less as ''repeal,'' and more and more as a moral duty. In part this was because the failure of Irish Repeal diminished O'Connell's power as a rhetorical analogue. Garrisonians also wished to distance themselves from proslavery writers who increasingly argued that the oppression of Ireland under the Union was worse than the oppression of slaves. As the apparent strength of the Slave Power seemed to grow in the 1850s, Garrisonians also muted previously pragmatic aspects of their disunionism. In 1854, Garrison would treat a copy of the Constitution like George Hopkins had wanted to treat the Haverhill petition twelve years earlier: He burned it publicly.
It is hard to look away from Garrison's pyrotechnics in 1854, but focusing only on later, more uncompromising expressions of disunionism creates a distorted view of its origins, and encourages an intellectual genealogy of disunionism that begins and ends with the puritanical creed of ''come-outer'' Perfectionism. This explanation of disunionism's origins not only passes over the years between Garrison's conversions to Perfectionism and disunionism but also fails to account for the evolution of disunionism after the start of the Civil War, when many Garrisonian disunionists vilified secessionists and cheered the Republican Party. If we understand disunionism solely as a byproduct of Perfectionism, it is hard to understand that transformation as anything but equivocation. John L. Thomas, surveying this volte-face in his biography of Garrison, exclaims, skeptically, that ''from Christian anarchy Garrisonism had been miraculously converted into a respectable theory of constitutional reform! '' 44 Without minimizing the distance that Garrisonians had traveled between 1842 and 1861, the conversion of disunionism into Unionism was not wholly miraculous. Congenital ties between Repealers and disunionists underline that disunionism began as a political strategy, not an unbending principle, thus helping to explain why Garrisonians discarded it once political conditions changed. In the 1842 debates over the Haverhill petition, southern politicians like Underwood averred that slavery depended on the Union. This confession directly inspired the Garrisonians' confidence that they could use popular demands for a ''repeal of the union,'' much like O'Connell was using similar demands in Ireland, to force political change in Congress from outside its walls. Secession, however, proved that the South no longer saw the Union as essential for the preservation of slavery, making the strategy of antislavery disunionists suddenly moot.
When asked about his change of mind about the Union in the 1860s, Garrison sometimes said that when he called the Constitution a covenant with death and an agreement with hell, he had ''no idea that [he] would live to see death and hell secede.'' It is possible to view that reply as disingenuous, but it suggests a point worth considering: The key difference between Garrisonian strategy in 1842 and 1861 was not a difference in the way disunionists saw the Union, but in the way southerners did. Once the union had been repealed, calls for its repeal no longer had the rhetorical force they once possessed. For both O'Connell and Garrison, calling for Reform or Repeal seemed promising only as long as their opponents appeared to value their respective Unions enough to acquiesce in desired reforms. 
